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MOORE v. LIBERTY NATIONAL LIFE INSURANCE CO.,

267 F.3d 1209 (11th Cir. 2001)
FACTS
Four African-American policyholders filed a class action suit in
federal district court claiming that Liberty National Life Insurance Company
(Liberty National) engaged in discriminatory practices from 1940 to the mid1970s.' They contended that Liberty National sought out low income
African-Americans and sold them industrial life insurance policies with
higher premiums and fewer benefits than those sold to whites.2 Plaintiffs
alleged claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and a number of state laws.3
In response, Liberty National moved for judgment on the pleadings
and the district court granted the motion.4 The district court held that the §
1981 claim was barred by the Alabama statute of limitations because the
plaintiffs failed to "alleg[e] fraudulent concealment with sufficient
particularity to toll the statute of limitations."5 Plaintiffs then filed a motion
to alter or amend the judgment and sought leave to amend their complaint.6
Plaintiffs included in the new complaint specific allegations of fraudulent
concealment and added claims under 42 U.S.C § 1982, "which prevents
racial discrimination in the maintenance of property."7 The district court
granted both motions! The court also decided that the two-year statute of
limitations would be tolled under Alabama law if these specific allegations
were true." 9
Liberty National argued that even if the complaint did not violate the
statute of limitations, Alabama's common law rule of repose, "which bars
any suit arising out of any event more than twenty years old," would bar
plaintiffs' civil rights claims.' ° In response, the court determined that the
state rule of repose did not apply to plaintiffs' federal civil rights claims." It
decided that absolute rules of repose are not essential components of federal
causes of action, thus "applying them to federal civil rights claims is
unnecessary and improper."' However, the court also found that statutes of
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limitations are necessary features of any cause of action. Moreover, because
Section 1981 does not contain a statute of limitations, federal courts are
forced to borrow the appropriate limitations period from state law. 13 The
court also rejected Liberty National's claim that Section 1981 and Section
1982 frustrate the purposes of Alabama's scheme of insurance4 regulation and
hence are reverse-preempted by the McCarran-Ferguson Act.'
Liberty National then filed an interlocutory appeal, and the district
court certified the following question for consideration:
"Whether
Alabama's 20 year common law rule of repose bars the Plaintiffs in this
action from pursing federal claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and § 1982?"'"
HOLDING
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that
Alabama's common law rule of repose did not apply to plaintiffs' Section
1981 and Section 1982 civil rights claims and that the McCarran-Ferguson
6
Act did not mandate the reverse-preemption of the claims.'
ANALYSIS
The court, in an opinion written by Circuit Judge Wilson, reviewed
the district court's denial of the judgment on the pleadings de novo. 17 It first
examined whether 42 U.S.C. § 1988(a) 8 requires that Alabama's rule of
repose be applied to plaintiffs' Section 1981 and Section 1982 claims. 9
Alabama's common law rule of repose bars claims that come about from

13id.
14Id.; McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (2001).
'S Moore v. Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 267 F.3d 1209, 1213 (11th Cir. 2001).
16Id. at 1212.
17 1d. at 1213.
'8 The text of 42 U.S.C. § 1988(a) states,
The jurisdiction in civil and criminal matters conferred on the district courts by the
provisions of titles 13, 24, and 70 of the Revised Statutes for the protection of all
persons in the United States in their civil rights, and for their vindication, shall be
exercised and enforced in conformity with the laws of the United States, so far as
such laws are suitable to carry the same into effect; but in all cases where they are
not adapted to the object, or are deficient in the provisions necessary to furnish
suitable remedies and punish offenses against law, the common law, as modified
and changed by the constitution and statutes of the State wherein the court having
jurisdiction of such civil or criminal cause is held, so far as the same is not
inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States, shall be extended
to and govern the said courts in the trial and disposition of the cause, and, if it is of
a criminal nature, in the infliction of punishment on the party found guilty.
19Moore, 267 F.3d at 1214.
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events that are more than twenty years old. 20 Although the rule is similar to a
statute of limitations, it is distinct and independent. 2' The only element in
the rule of repose is time.22 Circumstances are not considered in its
application.
Liberty National claimed that the repose doctrine should be applied
to plaintiffs' Section 1981 and Section 1982 claims.24 The court noted that
the Supreme Court has mandated "'a three-step process' [for] determining
the rules of decision applicable to [Federal] civil rights claims., 25 First,
courts should review the relevant civil rights statute for deficiencies which
would make it impossible to effect.26 If the court finds such a deficiency, it
should look to the common law of the forum state and borrow the
appropriate state rule.27 Finally, courts can apply the state common law only
if it "is not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United
States. 28
Liberty National argued that the lack of a rule of repose in the civil
rights statutes made them deficient and that Alabama's rule of repose should
be applied.29 In Felder v. Casey,30 the Supreme Court held that when
looking to see whether the civil rights statute is deficient, a court should
consider "(1) whether the absent provision is among the 'universally
familiar' aspects of litigation; and (2) whether the provision is 'indispensable
to any scheme of justice.' 3 1 The Court of Appeals found that statutes of
repose are rare in federal law and are not "universally familiar" aspects of
litigation.32
The court found this controversy to be analogous to that of Felder, in
which a Wisconsin statute required that plaintiffs seeking to sue a state entity
notify the defendant of intent to sue and request relief within 120 days of the
injury. 33 "If relief [was] denied, the plaintiff then ha[d] six months to bring

20

Id. at 1213.

21 id.

22Id.
23 id.
24 id.
23Id. at 1214.
26Id.
27 Id.
28 Id.
29

Id. at 1215.

30 Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131 (1988) (holding a state notice of claim statute to be inapplicable to

plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim).

31 Moore v. Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 267 F.3d 1209, 1215 (1 lth Cir. 2001) (quoting Felder,487 U.S. at
140).
32 id.

33Id.
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suit in state court. 3 4 The plaintiff in Felder brought a 42 U.S.C. § 1983
claim against the City of Milwaukee nine months after the incident giving
rise to the claim occurred. 3' The Wisconsin Supreme Court rejected the
claim for failure to comply with the time limit established by the notice of
claim statute.36 The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that
notice of claim statutes were neither "universally familiar" to federal causes
of action nor indispensable prerequisites to litigation. 37 Furthermore, the
court found that Congress did not intend for the court to borrow such a rule
under Section 1988. 3" Here, the Court of Appeals did not find the absence of
a rule of repose a deficiency in need of remedy by borrowing from state law,
however, it did find the absence of a statute of limitations in Section 1981
and Section 1982 to be such a deficiency.3 9
To identify the correct state statute of limitations to apply to
plaintiffs civil rights claims, the Court of Appeals looked to guidelines
provided by the Supreme Court. 40 "[A] state's general or residual statute of
limitations for personal injury torts should be borrowed for application to
federal civil rights claims arising under the Reconstruction-era Civil Rights
Acts." 4' When borrowing a state statute of limitations, federal courts should
use only as much as is needed to effect that limitations period. 42 "Only the
length of the limitations period, and the closely related questions of tolling
and application, are to be governed by state law."' a Application of additional
distinct state limitations, such as a rule of repose, would contradict the
mandate to borrow only what is needed to effect the state statute of
limitations. 44
Liberty National argued that a repose doctrine was integral and
"closely related" to the state statute of limitations.4 5 It further contended that
the rule of repose cannot be separated from the statute of limitations."
However, the Court of Appeals disagreed, citing distinct differences between
statutes of limitations and statutes of repose. 47 "A statute of limitations

34

id.

35Id.

6Id. at
3Id. at
8
'91d. at
3 1d. at

1215-16.
1216.
1217.
1216.

40id.

41Id. (citing Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235,250-51 (1989)).
42Id. at 1217 (citing West v. Conrail, 481 U.S. 35, 39-40 (1987)).
3Id. (quoting Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261,269 (1938)).
" Id.
45Id.

46ld.
7Id.
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normally governs the time within which legal proceedings must be
commenced after the cause of action accrues. A statute of repose, however,
limits the time within which an action
may be brought and is not related to
' 48
the accrual of any cause of action.
The court stated that for Liberty National to prevail on its claim, it
would have to demonstrate that the two statutes, "despite their distinctions,
are interdependent. '" ' The court found that the rule of repose and the statute
of limitations are not interdependent because they are triggered by entirely
distinct events. 50 Therefore, it was not necessary to apply the statute of
repose to affect the applicable state statute of limitations.i'
The court
declined to consider Liberty National's claim that Alabama's statute of
limitations
barred plaintiffs' claims, stating that the issue was not ripe for
52
review.
Finally, the Court considered whether the McCarran-Ferguson Act3
mandates preemption of plaintiffs' Section 1981 and Section 1982 claims.
"The McCarran-Ferguson Act states that '[n]o act of Congress shall be
construed to invalidate, impair, or supersede any law enacted by any State
for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance ... unless such Act
specifically relates to the business of insurance.' ' 5 4 The court noted that
"[t]he Act thus bars the application of federal law if (1) the federal statute at
issue does not 'specifically relat[e] to the business of insurance'; (2) the state
statute at issue was 'enacted ...for the purpose of regulating the business of
insurance;' and (3) application of the federal statute would 'invalidate,
impair, or supersede' the state statute." 5
Liberty National claimed that when applied, Section 1981 and
Section 1982 interfered with Alabama's own anti-discrimination insurance
statute, which stated,
No person shall make or permit any unfair discrimination between
individuals of the same class and equal expectation of life in the
rates charged for any contract of life insurance or of life annuity,
or in the dividends or other benefits payable thereon
or in any
56
other of the terms and conditions of such contract.

48Id. at 1218 (citing Bradway v. Am.Nat'l Red Cross, 992 F.2d 298, 301 (11th Cir. 1993)).
49id.
50

id.

s1 Id.
2

1d. at 1220.

53Id.

5 Id. (quoting McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (2001)).
sId. (quoting Humana Inc. v. Forsyth, 525 U.S. 299, 307 (1999)).
56 ALA. CODE

§ 27-12-11 (2001).
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Liberty National argued that Alabama bans discrimination against those with
equal expectation of life but permits other types of discrimination which
have an actuarial basis. 57 The court responded that Section 1981 and Section
1982 do not "specifically relate to the business of insurance" and that the
state statute at issue did. 8 Therefore the main issue was whether application
of Section 1981 and Sectionl982 would "invalidate, impair or supersede" the
state statute. 59
The court then turned to definitions provided by the United States
Supreme Court.60 "Invalidate 'means to render ineffective, generally without
providing a replacement rule or law,' while supersede generally 'means to
displace (and thus render ineffective) while providing a substitute rule.' 61
Impair means that "when federal law does not directly conflict with state
regulation, and when application of the federal law would not frustrate any
regime, the
declared state policy or interfere with a State's administrative
62
application.',
its
preclude
not
does
Act
McCarran-Ferguson
The Court of Appeals found that Section 1981 and Section 1982 did
not "invalidate" or "supersede" the Alabama statute by directly contradicting
the terms of the state statute or rendering it impossible to effect or
implement.63 Instead, they proscribed different, though possibly overlapping
conduct.64 Liberty National failed to demonstrate that Section 1981 and
Section 1982 frustrated any state policy when applied to insurance contracts,
because they did not show that it is the policy of Alabama to encourage or
condone racial distinctions with respect to life insurance.65
The court next discussed NAACP v. American Family Mutual
Insurance Co.,66 in which the Court of Appeals of the Seventh Circuit found
that Fair Housing Act provisions banning "redlining" in setting insurance
rates are not reverse-preempted by the McCarran-Ferguson Act because there
was no state decision, regulation, or statute "requiring redlining, condoning67
that practice,... or holding that redlining . . . does not violate state law.",

57Moore v. Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 267 F.3d 1209, 1220-21 (11 th Cir. 2001).
8
Id. at 1220.
s9 Id.
6
0Id. at 1221.
6' Id. (quoting Humana Inc. v. Forsyth, 525 U.S. 299, 307 (1999)).
62Id. (quoting Humana, 525 U.S. at 310).
63 id.
64/id.

61Id. at 1222.
6 NAACP v. Am. Family Mutual Ins. Co., 978 F.2d 287 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding that the McCarranFerguson Act applies to federal civil rights statutes when they directly conflict with state insurance law).
67 Moore v. Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 267 F.3d 1209, 1222 (1I1th Cir. 2001) (quoting NAACP, 978 F.2d
at 297).
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The Seventh Circuit had noted that the State did not intervene in the case to
argue that the federal law at issue would frustrate its scheme of insurance
regulation.6 8 Similarly, in this case, the State of Alabama did not intervene.69
Additionally, in SEC v. National Sec., Inc.,7 ° the Supreme Court
"upheld the SEC's authority (against a McCarran-Ferguson Act challenge) to
block an insurance company merger approved by the Arizona regulatory
authorities."' '7 The Court had found that Arizona had not ordered something
that the Federal Government sought to prohibit. 7 It had allowed respondents
to go forward with the merger, rather than requiring them. 73 The state had
decided that the merger satisfied the state's insurance guidelines, while the
federal government prohibited this merger for different reasons.74 The Court
had noted that Arizona's action was not an unambiguous command that the
merger go forward; rather, it was simply a grant of permission. 7' Therefore,
because Arizona's actions did not amount to an order to merge, the federal
action blocking the merger was not construed as inconsistent with Arizona's
regulatory scheme. v6

In this case, the Court of Appeals found "no inconsistency between
the state's interest in preventing 'unfair discrimination' between individuals
with similar life expectancies" and the national interest in preventing racial
discrimination under Section 1981 and 1982.77 Because Liberty National did
not demonstrate that the federal statutes impinged on any declared state
policy in the insurance context, the McCarran-Ferguson Act did not require
the reverse-preemption of plaintiffs' Section 1981 and Section 1982 claims.78
CONCLUSION
In 1944, the Supreme Court, in United States v. South-Eastern
Underwriters Ass'n, 9 "established that insurance companies transacting
business across state lines [are] subject to federal regulation under the

68 id.

69 Id.

SEC v. National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453 (1969).
7' Moore, 267 F.3d at 1222.
70

72 id.
73 id.
74 id.

75Id.
76

1d. (quoting Nat '1Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. at 463).
at 1223.

77Id.

78 id.

United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944) (establishing that the
Commerce Clause could be used to regulate the business of insurance and that that the Sherman Antitrust
Act applied to insurance companies).
79
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Commerce Clause" ° and are "subject to attack under the Sherman Antitrust
Act."81 In response to the Southeastern Underwriters decision, Congress
passed the McCarran-Ferguson Act. 2 In doing so, Congress wanted to
preserve the states' traditional role of regulating and taxing the business of
insurance and to provide limited protection for the insurance industry from
antitrust actions. 83
Despite the economic impetus for the McCarran-Ferguson Act's
adoption, the text of the statute requires a reverse preemption of federal law
whenever a federal law does not "specifically relate to the business of
insurance," yet "invalidate[s], impair[s], or supersede[s]" a state statute
"enacted . . . for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance. 8 4
Therefore, it is unclear whether federal civil rights statutes, not relating to the
business of insurance, can be applied to insurance discrimination. Do federal
civil rights statutes "invalidate, impair, or supersede" state insurance
regulations and policies in a given jurisdiction?
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals considered the issue in Spirt v.
Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n.5 The case concerned whether the McCarranFerguson Act prohibited the application of Title VII to the use of sexsegregated mortality tables in retirement plans.8 6 The Second Circuit
explored the legislative intent of Congress in enacting the McCarranFerguson Act and concluded that in Congress only meant to preserve the
states' historical rights to regulate and tax insurance. 7 It found that
Congress did not intend to interfere with the application of subsequently
enacted federal civil rights statutes.8 Other circuits, however, have not
adopted the Second Circuit's reasoning or its legislative history approach. 9
Other courts that have taken up the question have based their decisions on
narrower grounds, instead choosing a "plain statement" approach that has

soMackey

v. Nationwide Ins. Cos., 724 F.2d 419, 420 (4th Cir. 1984) (finding no state law which
conflicted with or which was impaired by the Civil Rights Acts of 1866 and 1871 or the Fair Housing Act
and concluding that therefore the McCarran-Ferguson Act's reverse preemption provision did not apply).
s1Spirt v. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n, 691 F.2d 1054, 1064 (2d Cir. 1982) (concluding that it was not
Congress' intent for the McCarran-Ferguson Act to preempt the application of federal civil rights statutes
to insurance discrimination).
2

Mackey, 724 F.2d at 420.

s3id.

4 Moore v. Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 267 F.3d 1209, 1220 (11th Cir. 2001) (quoting McCarranFerguson Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (2001)).
s Spirt, 691 F.2d 1054.
"Id. at 1056-57.

" ld. at 1065.
Id.
"Id.
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narrowed the definition of "impair" to allow the application of civil rights
statutes in an increasing number of situations.90
In Mackey v. Nationwide Ins. Cos.,9' the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit considered whether claims of "redlining" by
an insurance company, brought under the Civil Rights Acts of 1866 and
187192 and the Fair Housing Act,93 were precluded by the McCarranFerguson Act. 94 In deciding that they were not, the court stated that it found
no state law with which the Civil Rights Acts or the Fair Housing Act would
conflict. 9 The silence of the state on the issue of civil rights permitted the
application of the federal civil rights laws.96 The court declined to consider
the broader question raised in Spirt of whether the McCarran-Ferguson Act
prohibited the application of all federal civil rights laws.97 The court held
only that the McCarran-Ferguson Act did not apply in the situation before
9
it. 8

In NAACP v. American Family Mutual Ins. Co.,99 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit directly criticized the holding in
Spirt and instead embraced a "plain statement" approach to the McCarranFerguson Act °° The court held that the McCarran-Ferguson Act does apply
to civil rights statutes. 0 1 However, when analyzing Wisconsin insurance
statutes, the court only found laws consistent with that of the Fair Housing
Act.10 2 The court held that consistent state statutes did not fulfill the
McCarran-Ferguson requirement that the federal statute "invalidate, impair,
or supersede" a state statute. 0 3 "American Family needs to show that the
' 4
Fair Housing Act conflicts with state law. Duplication is not conflict." 0
The decision put the burden of demonstrating conflict on the defendant
insurance company. 0 5 In addition, the court recognized that "[n]othing in
this conclusion permits federal law to displace states' choices about the
proper conduct of the business of insurance. If Wisconsin wants to authorize

0 Id.
91 Mackey v. Nationwide Ins. Cos., 724 F.2d 419 (4th Cir. 1984).
92 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982, 1985(3) (2003).

9342 U.S.C. §3601, et seq. (2003).
94Mackey, 724 F.2d at 420.
9' Id. at 421.
96Id.
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 NAACP v. American Family Mutual Ins. Co., 978 F.2d 287 (7th Cir. 1992).
'00 Id. at 294.
-01Id. at 295.
1

02 Id.
103id.
104id.

o15
Id.
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redlining, it need only say so; if it does, any challenge to 0that
practice under
6
the auspices of the Fair Housing Act becomes untenable."'
Moore takes the reasoning of American Family further by focusing
less directly on the statutes themselves and instead on the principles of the
07
state insurance anti-discrimination statute and the federal Civil Rights Act.'
In Moore, the court found that the two principles were "complementary."' 0 8
Consequently, the McCarran-Ferguson Act did not require the preemption of
the federal statute.'0 9 The court also clarified the definition of impairment." 0
According to Moore, impairment requires a direct conflict between statutes
or between the federal statute and a policy integral to the state's regulatory
scheme. "'
The burden is on the defendant insurance company to
demonstrate such a conflict, including in some cases that it is in fact the
policy of the state
to encourage or condone a certain type of insurance
2
discrimination."
Moore and the line of decisions from which it descends do not
establish directly that all federal civil rights statutes can be applied to
insurance discrimination claims." 3
However, the application of the
McCarran-Ferguson Act's reverse preemption has become progressively
narrower. "Courts have consistently rejected the McCarran-Ferguson Act
defense in race-based discrimination cases despite comprehensive state
' 14
regulatory schemes and laws prohibiting discrimination in insurance." "
The cases have recognized only one situation in which state insurance law
would preempt a federal civil rights statute: a situation in which a state has
expressly stated a policy or regulation which allows a certain type of
discrimination or in which a state expressly limits the remedies for a certain
type of discrimination." 5 However, this situation has yet to arise and be
applied by any court.
For civil rights plaintiffs, these decisions forebode that in almost all
situations, federal civil rights statutes will be applicable to insurance
discrimination actions, thereby providing plaintiffs with more options and
remedies to pursue. In addition, the application of federal civil rights statutes
acts as somewhat of an equalizer between states whose own insurance anti-

"6Id. at 297.
107Moore v. Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 267 F.3d 1209, 1223 (11 th Cir. 2001).
logId.
1o9Id.

"oId. at 1221.
Id.
"id.

113Id.

at 1222.

114Dehoyos v. Allstate Corp., No. SA-01-CA-1010-FB, 2002 WL 1491650, *3 (W.D. Tex. 2002).
"' Dehoyos, 2002 WL 1491650 at *3.
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discrimination statutes may vary in breadth and available remedies. For
defendant insurance companies to combat the application of federal civil
rights statutes to insurance discrimination claims, they must show a direct
conflict between state and federal laws or they must demonstrate that a
federal civil rights law would impair a stated state policy goal.
Courts continue to recognize that states which do expressly state that
they intend insurance discrimination to be exclusively their own providence
will render the federal civil rights statues ineffective against insurance
companies in that state. This gives state legislatures the ability to keep
federal civil rights statues from being applied to insurance in their state. In
practice, however, doing so by exempting some or all types of insurance
discrimination from interference would be politically unpopular and
therefore difficult to accomplish. Nevertheless, the act of expressly limiting
remedies for insurance discrimination to the exclusion of federal civil rights
laws could very possibly be a threat to federal civil rights laws as they apply
to the business of insurance.
Summary and Analysis Prepared By:
Ingrid Heide

